ISBN: 978-981-18-5852-9 DOI: 10.18178/wcse.2022.04.178
Evolutionary Game between the Crowdfunding Initiators and Crowdfunding Investors
Abstract— Crowdfunding is one of the ways to provide newly available funds for enterprises. This paper establishes an evolutionary game model for crowdfunding Initiators and investors to analyze evolutionary stability strategies. the factors that influence the strategic behavior of crowdfunding Initiators and investors, in theory, are found via the evolutionary equilibrium point of the model, and the influencing factors that affect the survival or extinction of crowdfunding activities are obtained.
Index Terms— crowdfunding, evolutionary game, crowdfunding investors, crowdfunding initiators.
Fan Gao
Macau University of Science and Technology
Rachael Ip
Macau University of Science and Technology
Yun Huang
Macau University of Science and Technology
Huimin Jiang
Macau University of Science and Technology
Cite: Fan Gao, Rachael Ip, Yun Huang, Huimin Jiang, " Evolutionary Game between the Crowdfunding Initiators and Crowdfunding Investors, " WCSE 2022 Spring Event: 2022 9th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Applications, pp. 1541-1546, Sanya, China, April 15-18, 2022.