WCSE 2018 ISBN: 978-981-11-7861-0
DOI: 10.18178/wcse.2018.06.067

Game and Decision of the Developer and the Retailer under Similar Consignment Mode

Lei Jiang, Wei Chen, Wu Su

Abstract— Under the similar consignment background, this paper discusses the problem of how the supply chain made up of a developer and a retailer can make the optimal decision and coordinate the supply chain through bargaining. The retailer decides the proportion of the developer to carry out the product consignment, and the developer makes the product price and the product quality investment. The market demand depends on the product price and quality input of the developer, Different from the uncertain demand of consignment mode, in the situation which the market demand is certain, The game equilibrium solution under decentralized decision and the profit of supply chain under centralized decision are discussed .As a result, there is only a R-Stackelberg equilibrium in the decentralized decision, and the supply chain performance is better than the centralized decision. Finally, through the bargaining question, we get the motivation of the supply chain enterprises to adopt the centralized decision under the certain condition.

Index Terms— consignment; centralized decision; supply chain coordination; Stackelberg game; bargaining

Lei Jiang
Department of Mathematics, Chengdu Textile College, CHINA
Wei Chen, Wu Su
Department of Fundamental Courses, Chengdu Polytechnic, CHINA


Cite: Lei Jiang, Wei Chen, Wu Su, "Game and Decision of the Developer and the Retailer under Similar Consignment Mode," Proceedings of 2018 the 8th International Workshop on Computer Science and Engineering, pp. 380-386, Bangkok, 28-30 June, 2018.